Comparative judicial discretion: An empirical test of economic models
- 1 September 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 295-313
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(96)00018-x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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