Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution
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- 6 April 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 61 (5) , 052304
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.61.052304
Abstract
I prove the security of quantum key distribution against individual attacks for realistic signals sources, including weak coherent pulses and down-conversion sources. The proof applies to the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with the standard detection scheme (no strong reference pulse). I obtain a formula for the secure bit rate per time slot of an experimental setup, which can be used to optimize the performance of existing schemes for the considered scenario.Keywords
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