The Core of the Constitution
- 1 December 1987
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1155-1174
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1962583
Abstract
It is often argued that the United States Constitution was designed so as to create a stable political order. Yet in the literature on the formal theory of democracy, there has been very little examination of constitutional provisions for their stability-inducing properties. In this paper we demonstrate that bicameralism and the executive veto tend to create stability, that the legislative override of the executive veto tends to undermine this stability, and that the interaction of bicameralism and the executive veto is likely to produce stable outcomes despite the destabilizing impact of the veto override.Keywords
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