Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact
- 31 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 61 (1) , 187-208
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00083-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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