Rolston on Intrinsic Value
- 1 January 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Environmental Ethics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 129-143
- https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics199214229
Abstract
Central to Holmes Rolston's Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most environmental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston's theory is similar to Paul Taylor's in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes and elemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of the metaphysical foundations of modern science-a problem Rolston never directly confronts. The modern scientific world view is obsolete. A post-modern scientific world view provides for a range of potential values in nature actualizable upon interaction with consciousness. The best that a modem scientific world view can provide are subject-generated-though not necessarily subject-centered-values in nature.This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Ethics of Respect for NatureEnvironmental Ethics, 1981
- Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental EthicPublished by Philosophy Documentation Center ,1973