The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 66 (S3) , S362-S378
- https://doi.org/10.1086/392738
Abstract
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surroundin...Keywords
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