Are Designated Market Makers Necessary in Centralized Limit Order Markets?
Preprint
- 1 January 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper models price formation and order placement strategies in a dynamic centralized limit order market with designated non monopolist market makers. ThisKeywords
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