Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup
- 1 July 1992
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 539-572
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2010487
Abstract
This paper tests the objective (professionalization) and subjective (party penetration) models of Soviet civil-military relations. The objective model is found to provide the best fit and is used to investigate further the factors leading to military participation in, and withdrawal from, the coup of August 1991. The objective model points to the importance of threats to professional autonomy and national unity, the politicization of the military, and declining regime legitimacy as the primary causal factors in the participation of the military in the coup. It also stresses the importance of military professionalism as a barrier to intervention and as a cause of military paralysis during the coup. Furthermore, the model points to the importance of democratic legitimacy in future civilian control and to the need for increased military professionalism to forestall threats to the post-Soviet regime.Keywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1990
- International Leverage on Soviet Domestic ChangeWorld Politics, 1989
- Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Developmental StrategyAmerican Political Science Review, 1989
- A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military RelationsWorld Politics, 1980
- Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian AuthorityPublished by Harvard University Press ,1979