Optimal contracts with public ex post information
Open Access
- 1 June 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 45 (1) , 189-199
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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