Not Quite By Accident
- 1 January 1988
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue Canadienne de Philosophie
- Vol. 27 (2) , 287-297
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300019788
Abstract
In the etiology of teleological functions, what role can be played by accidental occurrences? Douglas Ehring's essay “Accidental Functions” constructs a theory of ideological functions which makes it possible for objects to have functions even when their causal origins are due entirely to accident—be they natural functions (the function of the heart) or artifact functions (the function of a watch). Ehring constructs this view on the basis of a set of putative counterexamples aimed largely at the theories of Enc and Adams. Both of these theories block the attribution of ideological function to structures with entirely accidental causal histories—accidental in originandin the way their effects are causally sustained.Keywords
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