Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause
- 1 June 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 17 (2) , 233-279
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00028-3
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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