THE EFFECT OF AUCTION FORMAT ON EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE IN DIVISIBLE GOODS AUCTIONS: A TEST USING KOREAN TREASURY AUCTIONS*
- 1 June 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (2) , 290-332
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00342.x
Abstract
This paper measures the efficiency and revenue properties of the two most popular formats for divisible goods auctions: the uniform‐price and discriminatory auction. We analyze bids into the Korean Treasury auctions which have used both formats. We find that the discriminatory auction yields statistically higher revenue. Unlike previous work that uses data from only one format, we are able to compare the efficiency properties of the two formats. We find that the discriminatory auction better allocates treasury bills to the highest value financial institutions. However, the differences in revenue and efficiency are not large because the auctions are very competitive.Keywords
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