Alternative theories of sharecropping: Some tests using evidence from northeast India
- 1 July 1977
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 13 (4) , 317-346
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00220387708421647
Abstract
The recent debate concerning the efficiency of sharecropping contracts yields a number of testable hypotheses, four of which can be examined in the light of some primary data for a group of sharecroppers in northeast Bihar. The salient feature of the empirical analysis is the comparison of the resource allocation patterns on owned and rented land cultivated by the same farmer, which provides a more powerful test of inefficiency than those advocated previously. Broadly speaking, the findings support the ‘Marshallian’ position that such contracts do involve inefficiency—in the Bihar context, at least.Keywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Incentives and Risk Sharing in SharecroppingThe Review of Economic Studies, 1974
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- Resource Allocation under Share ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1950