Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria
Preprint
- 1 February 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a game achieved by perturbing payoffs by at most e/2, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.Keywords
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