Towards a Cognitive Robotics
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 7 (1) , 5-16
- https://doi.org/10.1177/105971239900700101
Abstract
There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of internal representation. This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the basic premises of the work (in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the first place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering an account (an example and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal Robust Representationalism (MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about this notion. We end (Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our account, a science (e.g., robot ics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.Keywords
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