The incentive problem and the design of investment banking contracts
- 1 July 1979
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 3 (2) , 157-175
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(79)90012-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent RelationshipThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Investment Banking: An Economic Analysis of Optimal Underwriting ContractsThe Journal of Finance, 1977
- The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an OrganizationThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1976
- The Theory of SyndicatesEconometrica, 1968
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the LargeEconometrica, 1964
- Equilibrium in a Reinsurance MarketEconometrica, 1962