A game-theoretic formulation of multi-agent resource allocation
- 1 June 2000
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 349-356
- https://doi.org/10.1145/336595.337525
Abstract
This paper considers resource allocation in a network with mobile agents competing for computational priority. We formulate this problem as a multi-agent game with the players being agents purchasing service from a common server. We show that there exists a computable Nash equilibrium when agents have perfect information into the future. We simulate a network of hosts and agents using our strategy to show that our resource-allocation mechanism effectively prioritizes agents according to their endowments.Keywords
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