Intellectual property protection and antitrust in the developing world: crisis, coercion, and choice
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 49 (2) , 315-349
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300028411
Abstract
After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries adopted new policies regarding intellectual property protection only as a result of a coercive U.S. strategy, consistent with a neorealist explanation based on power. Targeted countries have complied only on paper, not in practice, however. In contrast, hegemonic powers have not employed overt coercion in the area of antitrust policy, consistent with interpretivist neoliberalism, which emphasizes learning and voluntarism. A nuanced analysis of power and ideas is necessary to account for the differences between the cases. The different mechanisms through which the new policies have been adopted suggest different prospects for these new policies.Keywords
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