Trust, Coordination, and the Industrial Organization of Political Activism

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Abstract
We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a " low-trust" regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the coné rmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a " high-trust" regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers, and the policymaker' s response threshold is correspondingly lower. Within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We then study the optimal organization of inè uence activities, contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate. (JEL: D72, D78, D82)

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