History of Corporate Ownership in Italy
Preprint
- 1 March 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In this paper we use a unique data set, covering all companies traded on the Milan stock exchange during the Twentieth century, to study the evolution of the stock market, the dynamics of the ownership structure of traded firms, the birth of pyramidal groups, and the growth and decline of families in Italy. We find that the stock market evolved over time according to a non-monotonic pattern, with a more developed stock market at the beginning of the century than at the middle. Similarly, ownership structure was more diffused in 1940s than in 1980s. Moreover, family controlled groups and pyramids were less common in 1930s than in 1980s. These findings are inconsistent with the view that stock market development and ownership concentration are monotonically related with investor protection.Keywords
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