Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries

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Abstract
This article focuses on measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed U.S. fisheries. Novel measurement techniques are used to characterize the extent and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. According to the authors’ estimates, noncompliance increased substantially in 1986 and remained high through 1988 in the groundfish fishery. On Georges Bank during 1987, a quarter to a half of all groundfish vessels were identified as frequent violators, committing closed area violations on about one‐third of their trips and using illegal mesh on nearly all trips. Illegal earnings by a typical frequent violator operating in the groundfish fishery on Georges Bank amounted to $225,000 per year in 1987. A theory of compliance in fisheries is developed and applied to explain the trends and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. Biological and economic forces are shown to be dominant causes of the recent deterioration in compliance. Other contributing factors include weak sanctions and insufficient enforcement resources. The article concludes with a prognosis for the fishery and recommendations for improving compliance.

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