Toward a Definitive Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers
- 1 August 1988
- journal article
- Published by Duke University Press in Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 13 (4) , 635-662
- https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-13-4-635
Abstract
Despite decades of federal and state regulatory efforts to encourage more efficient utilization of hospital resources, recent federal antitrust enforcement actions assert that nonprofit hospital mergers are detrimental to consumers. This policy, however, is derived from misguided attempts to apply the economic assumptions of for-profit industries to the nonprofit hospital sector and to extend statutes enacted to restrain national economic concentration to local nonprofit enterprises. This paper concludes that a rational antitrust enforcement policy that recognizes the unique characteristics of hospital markets can be described within the confines of existing antitrust statutes.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Setting the Record StraightNew England Journal of Medicine, 1988
- Competition and the cost of hospital care, 1972 to 1982Published by American Medical Association (AMA) ,1987
- Effects of Surgeon Volume and Hospital Volume on Quality of Care in HospitalsMedical Care, 1987
- The Comparative Economic Performance of Investor-Owned Chain and Not-for-Profit HospitalsNew England Journal of Medicine, 1986
- Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private OptionsIndiana Law Review, 1986
- The Effects of Hospital Ownership On Nontraditional ServicesHealth Affairs, 1986
- Cost-Shifting: The Discount DilemmaJournal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 1984
- HMO-hospital relationshipsHealth Care Management Review, 1983