Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design
- 1 May 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 34 (2-3) , 303-310
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(90)90102-5
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign DebtInternational Economic Review, 1989
- Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contractEuropean Economic Review, 1987
- The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political Economy, 1986
- A Model of Borrowing and Lending with BankruptcyEconometrica, 1977
- The New Soviet Incentive ModelThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1976