Contractual Incompleteness, Contingent Control Rights, and the Design of Internet Portal Alliances

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Abstract
We test theoretical propositions from the literature on information and control in interfirm agreements using a sample of over 100 Internet portal alliance contracts. The literature on information and control in alliances suggests that the use of verifiable performance measures to allocate state-contingent control rights depends (a) on the precision of the information about the realized state and (b) on the level of information asymmetry between the two parties regarding the preferences of each. We test these propositions by looking at how the timing of agreements (a proxy for environmental uncertainty) and exclusivity restrictions (a proxy for incentive conflict) impact the use of a subset of available performance measures. Consistent with a signaling model of the allocation of contingent control rights, we find that contracts involve fewer contingent control rights as industries have matured. Where incentive conflicts are potentially greater, more contingent control rights are used.

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