Determinants of the Floating-to-Fixed Rate Debt Structure of Firms
- 28 February 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, monitoring, firm characteristics and market-timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that the CFO's (not CEO's) incentive has a strong influence on a firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm-risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (decreasing) debt structure. Internal monitoring by the CEO and independent board members as well as external monitoring through corporate control market weakens the link between CFO's incentive and debt structure. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives may be an important driver of various corporate decisions.Keywords
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