Religious Education and Value Assumptions

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Abstract
It is inevitable that certain value assumptions will underlie any curriculum proposals and an important task of the curriculum theorist is to justify these. But as we seek to identify, examine and justify the value assumptions which support our curriculum proposals we find ourselves caught up in a chain of infinite regress. Value assumptions underlying the curriculum are related to value assumptions underlying our general theory of education and these are reified within the formal structure of educational institutions and systems. Value assumptions underlying our general theory of education are related to an amalgam of value assumptions which a society makes about the nature, function and status of knowledge, the relationship of knowledge to human development and the relationship of the individual to society. These value assumptions, in turn, reflect, through the values and beliefs embedded in its culture, that society's value assumptions about the nature and destiny of human beings and the significance of human life. Given the fact of cultural, religious and ideological pluralism, and recognizing the value‐laden nature of any educational enterprise, the task of establishing an acceptable basis for teaching religion in schools ‐ one which enables the study of religions to conform to educational principles while preserving the integrity of those religions which are the objects of study ‐ is an essential prerequisite to the formulation of curriculum proposals. In illustration of these observations I propose to consider three different conceptions of religious education and to comment on the value assumptions underlying them. What distinguishes these three conceptions from each other is the sort of relationship they envisage between education and religion, their ‘estimates’ of education and religion, and what contribution they see the study of religion making to pupils’ learning.

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