Unobservable outcomes and multiattribute preferences in the evaluation of managerial performance*
- 1 September 1988
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 5 (1) , 96-124
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00697.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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