Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games
- 1 December 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 107 (2) , 191-222
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2947
Abstract
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