Organization structure and credibility: Evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the Glass-Steagall Act
- 31 August 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 39 (3) , 475-516
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(97)00022-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Outside directors and CEO turnoverPublished by Elsevier ,2002
- Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?Published by Elsevier ,1999
- The long-term default performance of bank underwritten security issuesJournal of Banking & Finance, 1994
- The underwriting experience of commercial bank affiliates prior to the Glass-Steagall Act: A reexamination of evidence for passage of the actJournal of Banking & Finance, 1994
- Commercial Bank Securities Activities: What Really Happened in 1902: NoteJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1992
- Mutual Banks and Stock BanksThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1988
- Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not haveJournal of Financial Economics, 1984
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- The Myth of the Security AffiliateJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1942