Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
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