Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 42 (3-5) , 573-582
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00117-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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