The Kernel of m-Quota Games
- 1 January 1965
- journal article
- Published by Canadian Mathematical Society in Canadian Journal of Mathematics
- Vol. 17, 239-244
- https://doi.org/10.4153/cjm-1965-022-x
Abstract
In (1), M. Davis and M. Maschler define the kernel K of a characteristic-function game; they also prove, among other theorems, that K is a subset of the bargaining set M1(i) and that it is never void, i.e. that for each coalition structure b there exists a payoff vector x such that the payoff configuration (x, b) belongs to K. The main advantage of the kernel, as it seems to us, is that it is easier to compute in many cases than the bargaining set M1(i).Keywords
This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:
- n-Person games with only 1, n − 1, and n-person permissible coalitionsJournal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 1963