Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 70 (3) , 1007-1033
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
Abstract
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