The High Unemployment Trap

1 May 1995

journal article
Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Vol. 110 (2) , 527-550
https://doi.org/10.2307/2118449

Abstract

A model of the labor market under firing restrictions and endogenous quits is constructed. It is shown that in the spirit of Blanchard and Summers, the model can generate multiple equilibria for plausible parameter values, with a low quits/high unemployment equilibrium coexisting with a high quits/low unemployment equilibrium.

Keywords

MODEL
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
PARAMETER VALUES
FIRING RESTRICTIONS
UNEMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM
QUITS/HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
PLAUSIBLE PARAMETER
HIGH QUITS/LOW

All Related Versions

Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: