Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions
- 1 May 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.Keywords
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