Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives*
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Finance Review
- Vol. 8 (3) , 327-353
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-004-2542-0
Abstract
This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors' exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly moKeywords
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