Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
- 1 July 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 4 (3) , 275-293
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90030-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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