6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action
- 1 October 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 6 (4) , 527-562
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692894006004006
Abstract
Ignoring the impact of changes in physical capital on a form of social capital - the rules used in farmer-organized irrigation systems - can lead to the unintended consequence that the physical capital is not as productive as intended. Analysis focuses on the choice of rules made by farmers in homogeneous and heterogeneous situations. Using this analysis, it is possible to illustrate why many donor-funded improvements in physical capital have had counterproductive results.Keywords
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