Impediments to universal preference-based default theories
- 31 May 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 49 (1-3) , 97-128
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(91)90007-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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