Debt Maturity and the Global Financial Architecture

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  • 1 January 2000
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      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
The paper starts from the premise that the debate on the ‘new architecture’ of the international financial system should be based on a theory that endogenizes the structure of countries' external liabilities. I present a model in which the maturity of a country's external sovereign debt is the solution to an incentives problem, which may lead to reliance on short-term debt and vulnerability to runs. I study, in the context of this model, the welfare effects of an international lender of last resort, measures aimed at coordinating creditors in crises, and a tax on short-term capital flows. These measures may increase or decrease global welfare, and always leave it strictly below the first-best level.
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