Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design

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Abstract
By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, we characterize the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uninformed (market) finance is optimal, and explain why bank debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held. We also show that the effectiveness of mixed finance may be impaired by the possibility of collusion between the firms and their informed lenders, and that in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract informed debt capacity will be exhausted before appealing to supplementary uninformed finance. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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