Seismic methods for verifying nuclear test bans

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
Seismological research of the past 25 years related to verification of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TIBT) indicates that a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments, including underground explosions, can be monitored with high reliablility down to explosions of very small size (about one kiloton). There would be high probability of successful identification of explosions of that size even if elaborate measures were taken to evade detection. Seismology provides the principal means of detecting, locating and identifying underground explosions and of determining their yields. We discuss a number of methods for identifying detected seismic events as being either explosions or earthquakes including the event’s location, depth and spectral character. The seismic waves generated by these two types of sources differ in a number of fundamental ways that can be utilized for identification or discrimination. All of the long‐standing issues related to a comprehensive treaty were resolved in principle (and in may cases in detail) in negotiations between the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britian from 1977 to 1980. Those negotiations have not resumed since 1980. Inadequate seismic means of verifying a CTBT, Soviet cheating on the 150‐kt limit of the Treshold Test Ban Treaty of 1976, and the need to develop and test new nuclear weapons were cited in 1982 by the U.S. government as reasons for not continuing negotiations for a CTBT. The first two reservations, which depend heavily on seismological information, are not supported scientifically. A CTBT could help to put a lid on the seemingly endless testing of new generations of nuclear weapons by both superpowers.

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: