The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments
- 1 June 1958
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 52 (2) , 349-366
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1952321
Abstract
Writers on parliamentary law frequently begin their essays by citing with approval Hatsell's famous observation that “… it is more material that there should be a rule to go by than what that rule is ….” So generally is this notion accepted that it probably ought to be regarded as a fundamental premise of parliamentary law. Indeed the whole structure of this branch of law rests on the assumption that form is more important than content. Its literature consists almost entirely of the compilation of precedents, and, furthermore, parliamentarians have seldom been concerned to justify the decisions they compile. This indifference to rationalization clearly follows from Hatsell's premise: if one believes that form alone is important, one appropriately concentrates on the form of rules, largely ignoring questions of whether or not their substance is efficient, or fair, or reasonable.Keywords
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