Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council

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Abstract
The United Nations is under pressure to make the Security Council more representative of the membership. The formal literature on voting power has discovered much that can clarify this debate, and the present analysis gives a version of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power that considers likely alliances based on voting in the General Assembly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Veto members occupying outlying positions, like China, have especially high voting power, whereas states without vetoes hold almost none. However, power in itself is not the goal; if another permanent member is already reliably voting as one wishes, obtaining a veto of one's own is unnecessary. Other benefits from membership are prestige and access to information. The current debate seems at an impasse, but if these alternative goals are recognized, other feasible solutions might be found.

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