Governance in Democratic Member‐Based Organisations
- 25 March 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
- Vol. 75 (1) , 33-60
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00242.x
Abstract
This paper considers issues of governance in democratic member‐based organisations (DMOs), such as co‐operatives and mutual societies. It examines the processes whereby members’ interests are mediated through the democratic process, and the board; and it explores some of the factors influencing the power of managers. It goes on to argue that the system of governance in DMOs in their institutional context runs the risks of managers becoming powerful and entrenched in poorly performing social economy organisations, unless countervailing measures are adopted.Keywords
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