Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Figure 4.14. Percentage of sons in the top and bottom earnings quartile by father’s quartilePublished by Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ,2018
- Open-end mutual funds and capital-gains taxesPublished by Elsevier ,1998