Firm Performance and Compensation Structure: Performance Elasticities of Average Employee Compensation
Preprint
- 1 January 1996
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Agency costs are a cost of production, and firms that do a better job of minimizing these costs should exhibit better performance. This paper tests this hypotheKeywords
All Related Versions
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