Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In a corporate freeze-out, the controller is required to compensate minority shareholders for the no-freezeout value of their shares that are taken from them.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict TransactionsUniversity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1999
- Buyouts in Large CompaniesThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1996
- Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate ControlThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
- Sales of Corporate ControlJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1993
- Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- A Restatement of Corporate FreezeoutsThe Yale Law Journal, 1978
- Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and TakeoversHarvard Law Review, 1974
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970