The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: An economic analysis
- 30 September 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 23 (2) , 179-200
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(92)90028-u
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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