Lifting the Veil: An Analysis of Pre‐trade Transparency at the NYSE
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- 2 March 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 60 (2) , 783-815
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00746.x
Abstract
We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.Keywords
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